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Abstract 
 
 
The international community proclaims victory when a conflict-ridden state is able to 
get rid of the main cause of the conflict. However, all the problems of the state do not end 
with that victory. It rather triggers a whole new set of problems, which combined with the 
aftermath of the conflict, leads the country to a larger crisis. Afghanistan, after the fall of 
Taliban regime in 2001, faced various social, political and economic challenges that marked 
the beginning of a transition period that was much more challenging than the previous period. 
In this paper, I discuss the major problems of transition-period Afghanistan and how the 
handling of these problems has shaped the image of the government inside the country and 
outside. I look into various variables that have played leading roles in Afghanistan in the past 
ten years (legitimacy, corruption, and state capacity), analyze their interconnectedness, and 
examine the state‘s vulnerability, leading to a discussion of whether there is an immediate 
need for a changed approach by national leadership.  I demonstrate the complex interaction of 
the variables in connection with their impact on economic development. Towards the end, I 
suggest the need for a balanced approach, including but not limited to the increase in sub- 
national capacity, which will involve strong leadership from the government to define and 
divide the functions of various actors involved in the stabilization of the country. We will see 
that Afghanistan‘s geographical location, its natural capacity and the international support it 
has been receiving provide it with immense prospect for stabilization and even development, 
providing that the variables analyzed in the paper are addressed. 
 
 
 
Key Words: Afghanistan, transition period, legitimacy, corruption, capacity 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
States are always evolving—they are always in a transition of some sort. Transition 
processes carry a set of challenges and opportunities for a state. In a highly interconnected 
world, like the one we have today, the transition process in one state involves many actors 
within and outside that particular state. In this paper, we analyze the transition in political and 
economic capabilities in a post-conflict transition-period Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan has been experiencing a profound transition since the events of 
 
September 2001. The Taliban government was toppled by a U.S. led coalition force and since 
then the state has gone through various political changes. Daily activities in Afghanistan have 
been endangered due to violent combat between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. With millions of dollars flowing into the country 
as foreign aid, people‘s expectations have risen. But the limited capacity of and effort from a 
weak and vulnerable political system, have taken the country not much further since the 
transition began. Security is still a big problem and development a far-away goal. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the transition of Afghanistan since 2001, using 
the transition literature as a conceptual starting point. The transition literature indicates that 
the Afghan transition has been a complex interplay of various actors—government, 
communities, insurgents, NGOs and international communities. The interplay helps us dissect 
the transition period and outline the major problems it posed to the stabilization of 
Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, we will examine its transition process in terms of our 
larger understanding of transition processes, focusing on the role of variables that include: 
legitimacy, corruption, state and sub-national capacity, and their complex interplay. Towards 
7  
the end, I will follow this analysis with an examination of the impact of the transition process 
 
on Afghanistan‘s economic development prospects. 
8  
 
 
II. The Theoretical and Regional Context 
 
 
 
A. What is a transition period? 
 
According to UNDP, transition periods are defined ―broadly as periods of 
multidimensional economic, political and/or societal change arising from a transfer of power 
or a period of conflict.‖1 The importance of a transition lies on the challenges that it poses to 
the effective running of a political system. Transition raises concerns over political authority, 
economic development, human rights, security, basic living infrastructures—food, clothing 
and shelter—and many more complex elements that create the backbone of a stable state. 
Sometimes, transition also threatens the statehood of the state by tampering with its 
legitimacy within the state and outside. Transition period is also a period for a state to reassess 
its political capacity and to create measures to develop it. A state goes through big changes in 
political leadership during a transition period, making it difficult for the new leadership to 
deal with security issues and develop state capacity at the same time. Also, while trying to 
stabilize the political situation of the state, governments ignore many social and economic 
issues, leading to the accumulation of complex problems, which in the course of time, cripple 
the state from all sides. 
The literature helps us identify some of the important variables that create the complex 
foundation of Afghanistan‘s transition period.  The most notable fact is that, although scholars 
identify one variable to be a little more important than the other, none of them disregard their 
interconnectedness. In fact, in analyzing this literature, one can argue that stabilization and 
 
 
 
 
1 United Nations Development Programme, Capacity Development Group, edited by Kann Wignaraja, 
―Capacity Development During Periods of Transition,‖ 2007, pg. 2. 
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development are almost impossible if any one of these variables is disregarded. Important 
variables include: 
1. Legitimacy 
 
Trust between people and the government is a very important tool for a country‘s 
 
progress. The US military occupation in 2001 was successful partly because of the support by 
Afghan people who desperately wanted to free themselves from Taliban shackles. Their 
welcoming of the international community also reflected their rejection of failed political 
leaders and movements of the past.
2   
The most important characteristic of a democratic 
government is that it should have the support of its people. Bhatia cites the definition of 
legitimacy as ―the capacity of a social or political system to develop and maintain a general 
belief that the existing social order is generally appropriate.‖3 
2. Corruption 
 
Transparency International defines corruption as ―the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.‖4 Corruption is a typical phenomenon in a developing state where people place 
family or ethnical ties over social or national responsibility. Corruption is possible only when 
at least one individual is in a powerful position. Since administrative positions have such 
powers, they are very susceptible to corruption in developing countries, due to the lack of 
regulatory mechanisms and effectiveness of the ‗rule of law.‘ Kurer uses various traditional 
definitions of corruption to devise a newer version based on what he calls ‗impartiality 
principle,‘ where he defines corruption as a violation of non-discrimination norms by a holder 
 
 
 
 
2 Thomas J. Barfield, ―Problems in Starting Legitimacy in Afghanistan,‖ Iranian Studies 3, no. 2 (2004): 
290, doi: 10.1080/0021086042000268100. 
3 Michael Bhatia, ―The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn 
Afghanistan,‖ International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (2007): 93, doi: 10.1080/13533310601114301. 
4 Transparency International. News Room, ―Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption,‖ 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq. 
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of public ofﬁce in order to gain a private advantage.5 Since the idea of impartiality or non- 
discrimination here suggests that every citizen deserves the right to be served equally, the 
question of corruption finds itself in a very significant position when we describe the 
interrelation of a government with its people. 
 
3. Capacity 
 
Capacity of the state is its ability to function. Understanding capacity is simple; for 
example, if terrorist activities are increasing in a state, then one can conclude that the state‘s 
capacity to counter these activities is low or diminishing. The issue then is the necessity for 
the state to develop its counterinsurgency efforts—that is, to develop its counterinsurgency 
capacity. Similarly if the foreign aid that comes to the country is not being put into best use to 
generate maximum output then it suggests that there is a lack of capacity to utilize foreign aid. 
To develop this capacity the government strengthens its institutions and policies that deal with 
foreign aid so that maximum yield is guaranteed. 
 
B. What is the historical context of  Af gh an istan’s  tran sition  p eriod ? 
 
Afghanistan stands out when the terms conflict and transition are mentioned. People 
believe that amidst the inaccessible mountains, there has always been a religious and political 
tug-of-war. However, it is unknown to many people that at one time this same country served 
as ‗a buffer-state‘ and was thought of as the ‗Switzerland of Asia.‘6 Afghanistan was a 
relatively peaceful state until the Soviet occupation of the country in 1978. 
Over time many dynasties ruled Afghanistan.  They did so, however, without 
 
strengthening the country‘s political and economic independence. This history made the 
 
5 Oscar Kurer, ―Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and Measurement,‖ Political Studies 
53, no. 1 (2005): 223, Academic Search Complete, EBSCO host. 
6 William Maley, ―Afghanistan: an historical and geographical appraisal,‖ International Review of the Red 
Cross 9, no. 880 (2010): 860, doi: 10.1017/S1816383111000154 859. 
11  
country highly centralized, weak and ultimately susceptible to the expansionism of the Soviet 
Union. The core of Soviet interest lay not just on the expansion of communism or on a race 
with the United States, but on threats that the large Muslim population of an unstable 
Afghanistan posed in spreading and influencing rebellion to neighboring Soviet Central Asia.
7
 
The Soviet regime in Afghanistan lasted for almost a decade starting in 1978 and created the 
 
platform for numerous conflicts that followed. 
 
The mujahedeen (followers of jihad)
8 
rose to combat Soviet forces and were aided 
greatly by the United States because of their common anti-communist ideals. However, in the 
course of time, especially after victory over the Soviets, the mujahedeen had an internal 
conflict leading to the formation of a pro-Pakistan Taliban group.
9   
The Taliban were a Sunni 
political-religious organization of mainly ethnic Pashtuns, separated from the mujahedeen, 
who sought to impose a conservative version of sharia, or Islamic law, throughout 
Afghanistan.
10 
When the rest of the world was emphasizing the need for freedom and 
equality, Afghan society faced all variety of Taliban-inspired assaults on human rights. 
 
Women were banned from going to schools, homosexuality became a sin, and drug 
cultivation reached its apex.
11 
The combination of a deplorable human-rights record and a 
growing allegiance to the terrorist group Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden led 
Taliban government to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 
For the purpose of this paper, all these periods of conflict and instability do not fall 
 
under the transition-period Afghanistan that we wish to focus on. In fact they create a 
 
 
 
 
7 Paul Dibb, ―The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: lessons to be learned,‖ Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 64, no. 5 ( 2010): 504, doi: 10.1080/10357718.2010.513366. 
8 Maley, ―Appraisal,‖ 866. 
9 Ibid., 869. 
10 Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Press, 2012), 14. 
11 Ibid., 15. 
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foundation for the transition period that began in 2001. On September 9, 2001, Al Qaeda 
assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban leader and two days later, they launched a 
series of attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States.
12   
This day 
stands out in history for two reasons: thousands of innocent lives were lost, and a devastating 
war began. The war was named ―War on Terror‖13 and the United States took a leading role in 
avenging the lives of its citizens that died during the attacks, in eliminating terrorist 
organizations around the world, and in dismantling the governments that ―sponsor, shelter and 
supply terrorists.‖14 American intelligence agencies had gathered a sufficient amount of 
evidence on Al Qaeda‘s bases being located in Afghanistan and of the Taliban‘s support for 
this organization. As a result, President Bush gave an ultimatum to the Taliban government 
with the following demands: 
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your 
land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly 
imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. 
Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, 
and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to 
appropriate  authorities.  Give  the  United  States  full  access  to  terrorist  training 
camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not 
open to negotiation or discussion.
15
 
 
The failure of the Taliban government to comply with the United States‘ demands 
resulted in ―Operation Enduring Freedom‖ on October 7, 2001.16 Although this was the 
beginning of another foreign military occupation in Afghanistan, it was different in many 
ways from the earlier Soviet incursion. Firstly, it was a multi-national operation, including 
countries such as United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and others assisting the American 
 
12 Maley, ―Appraisal,‖ 871. 
13 George W. Bush, ―State of the Union Address to the Nation,‖ White House Press Release, Washington 
D.C., January 29, 2002. 
14 George W. Bush, ―Address to the Nation,‖ White House Press Release, Washington D.C., September 20, 
2001. 
15 Bush, ―Address to the Nation.‖ 
16 Lansford, ―9/11,‖ 210. 
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soldiers. Secondly, the operation was not to invade Afghanistan but to restore democracy and 
peace in the nation by making it easy for those political parties, who abide by the Western 
democratic principles and commit against terrorism, to rule the country. The United States 
and the coalition forces succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban from Kabul on November 13, 
2001 and won over Kandahar on December 9, 2001 marking the end of Taliban regime.
17 
In a 
 
sense, the war was over; but in the aftermath of the war, the real challenge emerged. 
 
Afghanistan was in a period of change, which we now can connect to the idea 
of transition discussed earlier. Afghan people had seen large numbers of American soldiers 
march on their territory exclaiming the end of the Taliban regime but they had not yet seen the 
unveiling of women, remuneration of their lost property or rise in their living standard. The 
war created many angry groups of people, in Afghanistan and outside. Although it seemed 
like it started in an attempt to avenge the 9/11 attacks, theorists, social scientists, analysts, 
media, and people from all sectors gave varying interpretations on the implications of the war. 
The United States had seen ―in Afghanistan, al Qaeda‘s vision of the world‖18 but that reason 
wasn‘t sufficient for its elongated stay in the region. The U.S. defined its stay in Afghanistan 
as an effective means for empowering counter-terrorism activities in the region and supported 
this by initiating counter-terrorism activities in other states like Philippines, Bosnia and Iraq.
19
 
In order to identify the political challenges of the transition period in Afghanistan and to 
 
create measures to minimize the adverse effects of the war, international community 
 
convened in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 for the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. The 
 
Bonn Agreement established an interim authority called Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) 
 
 
 
 
17 Ibid., 211. 
18 Bush, ―Address to the Nation.‖ 
19 Bush, ―Union.‖ 
14  
under Hamid Karzai to govern Afghanistan for a period of 6 months.
20 
In June 2002, Hamid 
Karzai was elected as the interim head of the state by the Loya Jirga.
21 
However, Afghanistan 
faced a big crisis of securing its political legitimacy in the world. It took 3 years for an 
election to happen. The new Karzai-government had the responsibility of not just bringing all 
the unsatisfied factions together but also in creating opportunities for long-term sustainable 
development. None of these happened as expected, as the country became more confounded 
by its day-to-day social, political and economic crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, ―A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road 
Ahead in Afghanistan,‖ Institute for National Strategic Studies: Strategic Perspectives 8, (Washington, D.C.: 
NDU Press, 2011), 5. 
21 BBC News, ―Afghanistan Profile,‖ South Asia, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253. 
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III. Analysis of Variables and Implications for Afghanistan 
 
 
The first thing that one needs to know about Afghanistan‘s political ability is that 
Afghanistan had mostly been a ‗rentier state‘ whose central governments had always been 
dependent on extracting outside resources in order to maintain their stability.
22   
A rentier state 
is a state whose one sector accounts for the overwhelming proportion of its gross national 
product, with a minor contribution from domestic investment.
23 
In the case of Afghanistan, 
this one sector has been foreign aid. So when we measure the current government‘s abilities, 
we need to keep in mind that the government is a dependent actor. 
The source of that dependence is the International Community. Afghanistan is one of 
the poorest countries in the world and fairly insecure, considering that it had been a safe 
haven for many terrorist organizations in the past. A very important question today is: what is 
the goal of international community when it comes to Afghanistan? Carl Robichaud mentions 
that success in Afghanistan is based on the minimum condition that the Afghan state can 
constrain the threat of violent jihadism within its borders and contain any threats to the 
international order.
24   
For this to happen, a functioning state with popular support is deemed a 
must.
25 
The concern is that although the international community might be able to provide 
monetary and military support, it lies in the hands of Afghan leadership to gain popular 
support and authenticate its legitimacy. Afghanistan is a relatively safer place than it was in 
 
 
22 Barfield, ―Starting Legitimacy,‖ 286. 
23 Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, ―The Rentier State,‖ British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16, 
no. 2 (1989): pp. 195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/195155; Lisa Anderson, ―Policy-Making and Theory Building: 
Ame rican Political Science and the Islamic Middle East,‖ in Hisham Sharabi (ed.), Theory, Politics and The 
Arab World: Critical Responses (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 61, cited by Ahmet Kuru, "The Rentier State 
Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case," Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International 
Relations 1, no. 1 (2002): 52; the basic definition of a ‗rentier state‘ is ‗a state reliant not on extraction of the 
domestic population‘s surplus production but on externally generated revenues, or rents, such as those derived 
from oil. 
24 Carl Robichaud, ―Buying Time in Afghanistan,‖ World Policy Journal (Summer 2007): 2, doi: 
10.1162/wopj.2007.24.2.1. 
25 Ibid. 
16  
2001, however the increase in Taliban offensive activities since 2006 and their assumed rise 
to power after the expected military withdrawal by the U.S. by 2014 show that the tides are 
shifting and that the international effort in Afghanistan might be a mere repeat of the Soviet 
debacle.
26
 
 
A. Establishing legitimacy 
 
Establishing legitimacy is an ongoing struggle for the Afghan state.  The factors that 
question the legitimacy of the current government include:  its incompetence to manage and 
rebuild corrupt government institutions, its inability to install competent local governance, its 
failure to spend Western aid effectively, and its incapability of avoiding favoritism with 
respect to the fellow Durrani tribesman.
27
 
One of the failures of the current government has been its inability to hunt down and 
 
bring justice to brutal mujahedeen warlords. For example, Christian Parenti mentions that the 
jangsalarans—who are seen as thieves and murderers— ―are being folded into government 
and given new power and legitimacy by the UN and the U.S. backed government of Hamid 
Karzai.‖28 The same thieves and murderers are portrayed as the key players to the 
development of the state, further infuriating the local public and dismantling their belief in the 
 
government. Parenti also blames the international community for supporting the inclusion of 
these mujahedeen leaders and for turning Afghanistan in a narco-mafia state. 
29 
He relies on 
interviews with local people who express their frustration on ―why America has given these 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Ibid., 2, 3. 
27 Robert McMahon, ―Legitimacy Questions in Afghanistan,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, November 2, 
2009, 1, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/legitimacy-questions-afghanistan/p20584. 
28 Christian Parenti, ―Who Rules Afghanistan,‖ The Nation, November 15, 2004, pg. 13. 
29 Ibid., 13, 14. 
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commanders a position in the government.‖30   This rise in impunity shows that the current 
government is trying, by joining with the evil forces of the society, to prevent accountability 
for past crimes.
31
 
Bhatia examines the proposal of mujahedeen‘s ‗right to rule‘ by analyzing what roles 
and images they carry.
32 
He mentions that the mujahedeen are not seen as a similar entity as 
during the war against the Soviets.
33 
Today, when some mujahedeen ally themselves with the 
government, others join the Taliban and fight against the coalition forces. Still others exercise 
their power at the local level, often capturing the attention of NGOs and human rights 
activists.
34 
Not only do they constitute varying factions, often in conflict with each other, but 
the mujahedeen muddle the legitimacy of the central government. To recognize them as a 
legitimate force means to give back the painstakingly achieved steering wheel of 
Afghanistan‘s cart back to the ‗socially perceived evil forces‘, while to denounce them means 
to put a stop sign in the peace process by dissatisfying the powerful and violent actors of 
Afghan society. 
Legitimacy is at peril in Afghanistan also because of the government‘s inability to 
expand its influence outside Kabul. Before Karzai was reelected the President of Afghanistan 
in 2004, the new constitution of Afghanistan came into effect.
35 
This new constitution 
established a strong presidential system,
36 
as a result centralizing the power in Kabul, in the 
 
process disabling the government‘s ability to tie the Taliban-controlled rural areas together. 
 
Karzai‘s government‘s inability to mediate with the Taliban leaders has divided the country 
 
 
 
30 Ibid., 18. 
31 Robichaud, ―Buying Time,‖ 3. 
32 Bhatia, ―Future,‖ 104. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Lansford, ―9/11,‖ 219. 
36 Maley, ―appraisal,‖ 872. 
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into factions and the government faces a very difficult task of influencing people to take their 
side. In a poor country like Afghanistan where people‘s ways of lives are dictated by old 
traditional norms of local governance and strict Islamic values, the effectiveness of a 
centralized government in reaching out for all its people is low. Paretti writes: ―. . . out here in 
the desert and mountains there is no democracy, no nation building, no NGOs, no American 
patrols…. Now the only sign of something like state power is a local commander‘s young 
gunman with a bayonet on his AK-47.‖
37 
Afghanistan has failed to establish a centralized 
 
government that can reach out and control the rest of the country.  For a rentier state, a 
centralized government is very important in order to serve as a legitimate middleman between 
foreign aid and development projects. 
It is important for the government to expand its influence to every corner of the state 
to effectively distribute these funds and implement projects, but this process may be 
problematic. The idea of subnational governance sounds like a reasonable alternative in the 
case of Afghanistan, but will the Karzai government be able to allow local authorities to take 
the charge in their hands is the biggest question. This might not only make Kabul weak, but 
might also allow anti-Karzai leaders that are influential in their community to emerge as 
leaders of their towns and villages. The Karzai government fears that the influential local 
strongmen will position themselves in such a way that their bargaining power increases 
relative to the central government.
38 
However, the inability to be decentralized can create a 
big crowd of unsatisfied civilians, who feeling vulnerable after years of violence, can join 
rebellions. 
 
 
 
 
37 Parenti, ―Rules,― 18. 
38 Armando Geller et al., ―State Capacity and Conflict: Evidence from Afghanistan‖ Computational Social 
Science Society of America Annual Conference, Oct 9-12, 2011, Santa Fe, New Mexico. 4. 
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Elections are important to the change process during the transition period of a country. 
A country‘s government gets authentication in the eyes of the local and international 
community only through a fair victory in an election. Elections are also a backbone of a 
democratic system and an important measure to understand public opinion. Afghanistan 
doesn‘t have a good reputation when it comes to elections and this has made the government 
appear untrustworthy. The 2009 election gained its notoriety for being fraudulent.
39 
After the 
 
withdrawal of the chief opponent to Karzai in the presidential election in 2009, more questions 
have been raised from the international community on the legitimacy of the current 
government. Abdullah Abdullah withdrew his presidential candidacy claiming that the 
elections had been rigged, and when Hamid Karzai took over the presidency he did so amidst 
criticism from all over the world.
40 
The Taliban also got an opportunity to point fingers at the 
government and the international community, especially at the U.S. and the U.K., who despite 
the knowledge of the fraudulent votes, sent congratulations to Karzai.
41
 
Bhatia mentions that the government uses the national security forces to establish a 
 
‗monopoly of legitimate force.‘42 Afghan National Army (ANA) has worked diligently in 
collaboration with the coalition forces in order to fight insurgencies and terrorism in the 
region. It has also been pivotal in reconstruction efforts. Scholars believe that the military 
forces in Afghanistan not only have the burden of following orders from higher officials but 
also of tying the ethnically fragmented Afghan society together and creating a sense of 
national identity.
43 
Simonsen enlists the two main sources of legitimacy for a new national 
 
 
 
39 International Crisis Group, ―Afghanistan Conflict History,‖ January 2010, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/afghanistan.aspx. 
40 
NewStatesman , Leader , ―Killed in the Name of Crooked Karzai,‖ November 9, 2009, 7. 
41 NewStatesman , ―Crooked Karzai,‖ 7. 
42 Bhatia, ―Future,‖ 104. 
43Sven Gunnar Simonsen, ―Leaving Security in Safe Hands: Identity, Legitimacy and Cohesion in the New 
Afghan and Iraqi Armies,‖ Third World Quarterly 30, no. 8 (2009): 1490, doi: 10.1080/01436590903321851. 
20  
army as composition and mission.
44 
Since the soldiers in ANA are a mix of Uzbeks, Tajiks, 
Pashtuns, and many more tribes, the heterogeneity can create an environment of social 
tolerance and strengthen the backbone of Afghan society. However, scholars also fear that this 
composition can have short-term side effects such as the issue of cohesion in the individual 
unit.
45 
The United States—culturally different and not always positively perceived—has taken 
charge of most military operations in Afghanistan. This, on one hand, might give the Afghan 
national military legitimacy in the eyes of the international community but, on the other hand, 
might pose the threat of detaching them from their local, ethnic links and weakening their 
social legitimacy. Simonsen fears that the society can broadly reject the state‘s political and 
military agenda if it perceives the political leadership as representing foreign interests.
46 
The 
military culture of a country is also based on its value as a money-generating service. When 
the monetary value of joining the security forces outweighs its emotional/moral value, the 
respect for the position declines and so does the legitimacy of the force and of the government 
that it represents. 
 
B. Corruption 
 
The cancer of corruption is metastatic in Afghanistan. It will lead to a terminal 
condition,   unless   chemotherapy   to   reduce   the   chance   of   further   infection 
(preventive measures) is combined with surgery to remove the biggest infected 
nodules (the key villains)
47
 
 
Corruption has been one of the biggest problems of transition-period Afghanistan. 
Corruption is an important issue during any transitional period since leaders are not secure 
about the duration of their stay in ministerial positions. This will motivate them to indulge in 
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nepotism and the misuse of foreign aid for their personal benefits. They will exhaust all the 
funds while they are in those positions. The main concern, however, is that corruption has 
surged significantly during the transition period. Transparency International‘s Corruption 
Perception Index 2011 places Afghanistan at a rank of 180 with a score of 1.5, as the fourth 
most corrupt country in the world.
48 
The index ranks countries according to their perceived 
levels of public-sector corruption including, but not limited to, bribery of public officials, 
kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, et cetera.
49 
The range of 
corruption in Afghanistan expands from small bribes while issuing a license to the misuse of 
funds from international donors. 
Corruption in developing countries is not a new thing; however, what makes it special in 
the case of Afghanistan is its exponential rise since 2001. The low capacity of political 
institutions and the great influx of foreign aid during the war have been the root causes for 
corruption, not to mention that the social culture and the drug industry have been equally 
important forces for its cause. What makes corruption even more serious is its prevalence in 
government institutions that deal with providing services to the public directly. This not only 
hinders democratic governance but also adds to the legitimacy problem discussed earlier. 
Corruption comes as an accessory to the pre-existing drug-based economy in 
 
Afghanistan. Drug dealers influence and bribe political leaders and law enforcement officers 
 
in order to secure their trade. The more the government fails to effectively utilize international 
funds to cut down on national drug businesses, the more it loses its trust in the international 
community. The interrelation between the drug industry in Afghanistan and the state of 
corruption in the country is astounding. Goodhand blames the drug economy for being the 
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vehicle for accumulating power since political entrepreneurs seeking legitimacy have ―remote 
control‖ engagement with the drug trade where they work through connections lower down 
the chain.
50 
The involvement of government officials in drug economy stains the legitimacy 
 
of the government and undermines all the other activities they carry out. For example the 
Ministry of Interior (MoI), one of the most corrupt ministries, is seen as a ‗shop for selling 
[law enforcement] jobs,‘ particularly in areas that involve drug-control.51 
The UNDP‘s Report on Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations-2010 
 
provides important information on the status of corruption in Afghanistan, particularly as 
connected with the drug industry.  The opium industry‘s influence matched with the 
ineffectiveness of the current government is described in the UNDP report as a major cause of 
corruption in transition-period Afghanistan. The report states: ―Under the pre-2001 Taliban 
regime, the prevalence of corruption is reported to have been low. This has been attributed to 
that regime‘s high-profile punishment of petty corruption and the limited opportunities for 
corruption at that time due to small resource flows and to the de facto quasi-legal status of the 
opium economy.‖52 The UN‘s 2007 World Drug Report shows that opium production in 
Afghanistan has risen frighteningly.
53 
The opium industry has served both the farmers and 
 
government officials greatly in Afghanistan. The UNDP report mentions that about one-third 
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of the country‘s GDP is opium-based54, showing the government‘s incompetence in counter- 
narcotic programs. In fact, counter-narcotic programs have created more opportunities for 
corruption by providing the concerned officials with leverage to bargain with drug dealers for 
their share. Drug dealers have also had an impact on the police force by bribing the anti- 
narcotic officers to help with their trade. If the agency established to fight a problem instead 
becomes an agency that fosters it, then the magnitude of the problem is sure to surge 
exponentially. Corrupt government agencies have used their power and resources to crumble 
the nation than to empower it. The laissez-faire policy of the coalition forces towards drug, in 
order not to infuriate the local allies who were involved in this business, also contributed to 
the rise in opium production.
55
 
 
However, the drug industry is only one aspect of corruption in Afghanistan.  The 
involvement of public service providers in corruption reaches far beyond opium and 
marijuana. An article by the Canadian Medical Association Journal shows the paws of 
corruption have extended to the health industry, one of the most sensitive and vulnerable 
public sectors. It places doctors and nurses on the fifth and seventh position respectively on 
the list of people who typically demand incentives for their services, including ―better 
treatment.‖
56 
Corruption is like a chain reaction—one leading to another. Reuters mentions 
 
that senior officers and Interior Ministry officials take a cut of policemen salaries, who then 
exact bribes from the populace to make up their pay.
57 
This angers the people but at the same 
time influences them to join government services too so that they can benefit in the same way. 
As a result, both the political and social culture of the state becomes corrupt. 
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The extensive involvement of law enforcement officials, ranging from police officers to 
judges and prosecutors, in corruption is the most important threat to state legitimacy and 
development. People facing corruption in their everyday life is one thing, but not to be able to 
report these corruptions to the necessary law enforcement officials or courts is another. U.S. 
General Robert Cone, commander of the force that trains the Afghan army and police 
asserted, ―the final point is corruption, corruption, corruption; it is endemic‖ in an interview 
with the Reuters.
58 
The justice system is also a dysfunctional unit with incompetent judges 
and inadequate resources; and added to this is the frequent interference by government 
officials and militia commanders.
59 
Corruption in the judicial system not only halts the flow 
of service transfer and impacts good governance, but also messes up the checks and balances 
system of the country. In the shadow of a corrupt judicial system, the legislative and the 
executive bodies of the state exercise limitless power. This reduces the transparency and the 
accountability of the government, making it an unreliable actor in the development and 
rebuilding process. 
Corruption in Afghanistan doesn‘t only have internal roots. Foreign aid that comes into 
the country to assist with development and reconstruction efforts has become a major source 
of corruption in Afghanistan. The UNDP report blames ―large inflows of international 
assistance combined with the pressure to spend these funds quickly‖ as one of the three major 
causes of corruption in Afghanistan besides the opium industry and the failure of political 
institutions.
60 
The inflow was tremendous right after the fall of Taliban regime in 2001. There 
had not been a lot of research on the political, social, and cultural complexities of Afghanistan 
and thus international aid that entered the country had neither a well-planned goal (types of 
 
 
58 Ibid. 
59 UNDP, ―Corruption,‖ 93. 
60 UNDP, ―Corruption,‖ 92. 
62 Amitai Etzioni, ―Corruption Reduction,‖ Harvard International Review: Perspectives (Winter 2011): 25. 
 
25 
 
projects) nor an effective medium (government and local agencies) to put the funds into long- 
term, sustainable use. So, most of the money ended up in the pockets of government officials. 
President Karzai himself has acknowledged that ―there is corruption regarding international 
aid" and that it has complemented the corruption in his administration.
61 
Etzioni states that 
foreign aid can sometimes become ―a poisoned gift‖ promoting dependency on foreign states 
and disproportionately benefitting a certain group of people in the host country and providing 
more resources for corrupt agencies to exploit.
62 
From the perspective of the corrupt officials, 
foreign aid corruption is also a much easier and safer form of corruption than other forms of 
petty corruption and bribery. This is because the local population is generally unaware of the 
amount of foreign aid that enters the country or about its handling. So the officials don‘t find 
themselves accountable to the public. However, in the long run, when proposed and promised 
development projects get stalled at one point, people apparently know that there has been 
corruption in the higher level. To counter this form of corruption, international NGOs have 
recently started to deal directly with local agencies and provide them with aid rather than 
work through the central government. This clearly marks the failing legitimacy of the 
government in the eyes of the people and the international community. 
One of the indirect and unforeseen impacts of corruption is its shaping of a country‘s 
social culture. The purpose of the international community in Afghanistan is not just to make 
it a secure state but also to empower it in the long-term so that it becomes self-sustainable. 
For this, the local population, and more importantly the future generation, has to be taken care 
of. Corruption works exactly against this purpose by slowly engraving a selfish culture in the 
minds of the future generation, who see corruption as an indispensable part of their lives. 
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They base their actions and objectives on the foundation of corruption and grow up to become 
corrupt citizens. A villager‘s son, who sees his father pay bribes every day, grows up seeing 
corruption as a means to get work done. So, when he grows up to lead the nation or to work 
for the government, his childhood learning finds a laboratory, in his job, where he uses 
corruption as a tool to succeed and move up the ladder. This is a long-term social problem for 
Afghanistan and a retrogressive step for development since the potential manpower of the 
country is developing ideals based upon corruption. 
 
C. Lack of capacity 
 
In the case of transition-period Afghanistan, one of the biggest setbacks has been its lack 
of capacity to ensure efficient delivery of services in several areas including health care, 
education, state building, public administration, justice, security, aid utilization, human rights, 
gender equality, and many more. However, in this paper, we are not describing these specific 
areas. We rather see the capacity of the state and of the community from a broad perspective 
and analyze how its relative absence has affected all these different areas and the state as a 
whole. 
Riphenburg emphasizes the role of political capacity of the country as a driving force for 
economic progress and identifies three main capacities—extractive capability, institutional 
credibility and transparency—that combine to form the total political capacity.63 Extractive 
capability deals with the capacity of the government to extract taxes from people.
64 
The 
 
majority of Afghan population is involved in agriculture; and due to high levels of poverty in 
 
the country, tax generation is neither a big source of income nor a priority. Local warlords‘ 
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involvement in local governance and their value in aiding the security efforts of the national 
government also make it difficult to tax them. Transparency deals with the opening of Afghan 
society to the world through means of media, internet, and news sharing. Its significance in 
educating people in political and economic issues is unavoidable, and its political impact was 
also evident during the Arab Spring, where internet and communication technologies were 
pivotal in the revolutionary movement. However, in the case of Afghanistan, the most 
important capacity issue lies in institutional credibility. 
Institutional credibility is a major factor for legitimizing the government and its activities. 
Ripenburg defines institutional credibility as the accountability necessary to attract private 
capital.
65 
This has been an area where the government has been lagging behind during the 
transition period and has been thoroughly criticized by the local people and the international 
community. The capacity of government institutions to oversee and enforce policies is lacking 
at all levels as a result of highly centralized administrative arrangements, lack of skilled 
professionals, gender imbalance, low pay and a lack of merit-based recruitment.
66
 
Corruption in the government has also contributed to the lack of capacity to implement 
 
policies and, especially, to utilize foreign aid. We have already mentioned in the previous 
sections the dreadful impacts of corruption in Afghan societies. Corruption and state capacity 
are linked very closely together.  One report mentions how the relative absence of two types 
of capacity has contributed to corruption: 
 Absence of legal and regulatory systems and efficient enforcement, as well as 
absence of institutional structures that encourage accountability, transparency 
and information sharing 
 Low level of salaries in the public sector and delays in payment67 
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The lack of institutional capacity in Afghanistan comes from the enormity of the task 
that the government has to face and the overlapping functions between Ministries, Central 
Government and local governments.
68 
Public administration is at jeopardy and can crash 
anytime if efforts are not made towards its reformation. The influx of foreign aid adds to the 
misery since incompetent and perplexed departments are provided with an amount of money, 
which they don‘t have the capacity to utilize. To help in this endeavor, donor communities 
have, at several times, sought to build up the implementation capacity of the bureaucracy 
through provision of training.
69 
However, the state hasn‘t been able to follow up on these 
measures and thus many departments lack trained and educated manpower. 
One of the other problems is that many departments within the government were formed 
in the recent years in order to better fulfill the changing needs of a developing Afghanistan. 
Such departments address short term needs and are focused to aid-specific national and 
international projects. A lot of money flows in to support these departments; however, even 
after the completion of the work, they keep staying on the budget agenda like other 
departments and waste money on non-functioning employees. A report calls them ―ghost 
employees‖, since they are listed on the payrolls of Ministries but actually don‘t work.
70
 
 
However the government version of the story should not be completely disregarded. The 
government argues that the international agencies hold most of the funds, information and 
analysis, thus making it difficult for the government to implement policies and allocate funds 
at its will.
71 
On the basis of these premises, the government has sought to contract out the 
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implementation process to private sector, the UN and NGOs rather than building up its own 
implementation capacity.
72
 
Nepotism is another important cause for the declining capacity of the state. Just like 
corruption, nepotism has been embedded in Afghani culture, society and political behavior for 
some time. Afghanistan has a weak civil society centered on family, tribe and community, 
with a minimum number of opportunities for women. Due to the lack of female participation 
in political discourse, the local community is missing out on a huge chunk of population that 
could complement its voice against unaccountable government policies. And due to the tribe- 
centered nature of the community, favoritism has overcome merit-based recruitment. The 
tendency of many international agencies that operate in Afghanistan to hire employees from 
their home country has only exacerbated the unemployment problem of Afghanistan. Since 
foreigners are taking employment opportunities from local Afghans and depleting the 
resources assigned to Afghanistan, the Afghani people are losing their faith both in the 
government and in the international community. Politicization of the public administration 
institutions and absence of a merit-based system, a major characteristic of Afghani political 
and social structure, have been cited as the underlying causes for the lack of institutional 
capacity.
73
 
 
1. Centralized vs. Decentralized Governance: 
 
The discussion on capacity leads us to analyze whether a centralized state is 
beneficial in the case of Afghanistan or not. Our study and discussion of legitimacy, 
corruption and capacity helps us underline some of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
centralized Afghan state. The advantages are: 
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 A centralized government unifies the various tribes and ethnic communities under 
one flag and infuses the idea of a ―nation‖, by inviting people of varied ethnicities 
and background in the nation-building process by providing jobs and securing their 
rights and engaging them in infrastructure development. 
 A centralized state adds legitimacy to the government by serving as a tool for 
international diplomacy. 
 A centralized state serves as a responsible medium for the implementation of 
development policies and practices in the country, through taking responsibility of 
and utilizing foreign aid, and by ensuring accountability and transparency. 
 A centralized government strengthens the national security forces by providing 
uniformity in their structure and functioning and by illegitimatizing other non- 
governmental, self-operating armed groups. 
 A centralized government ties all lower level governing authorities together, by 
serving as a powerful inspector and demanding them to report all their activities, 
ensuring that the local people are served well and that lower-level corruption is 
reduced. 
Some of the advantages outlined above also create a platform for many disadvantages that 
the centralized government has on a country like Afghanistan. Some of them are: 
 A centralized government comprised of members of former, ousted government, as it 
appears to be the case with Afghanistan, can become of symbol of ‗impunity from 
violence‘ and can lose the trust of the people who sacrificed their lives to change the 
country‘s leadership. 
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  A centralized government comprised of leaders who are less aware and educated of 
the country‘s intricate complexities, but highly backed up by the international 
community can also make it a victim of public discontent and rejection. 
 A centralized government cannot expand its influence far from its physical operating 
location (in this case Kabul) and thus fails to secure and develop the entire country 
uniformly. This failure means that the country is never able to fully secure itself as 
terrorist groups merely shift their power hold from Kabul to a different district of the 
country. Development in one region (close to the capital) also comes at the expense of 
another (far from the capital). 
 A central government, if corrupt (as is the case in Afghanistan), reduces the 
possibility of effective foreign aid utilization and multi-dimensional development. 
 Proportionate representation is almost impossible in a centralized government with 
local resources, manpower and participation being neglected. 
 The possibility of power sharing with sub-national authorities is reduced, thus 
increasing the work load of the central government which ends up having to deal with 
bigger issues like terrorism and smaller issues like petty thieves at the same time. 
 
2. Effort at sub-national level: 
 
Now since we have talked about both positive and negative values of a centralized 
government, the question of capacity building moves from the central government to sub- 
national and local level. What is the current status and future value of local capacity 
development and what does it actually mean? The government of Afghanistan has realized the 
necessity of a balance between rigid centralism and moderate decentralization, encouraging 
provincial and district-level administrations to improve their management systems and 
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providing them with more financial autonomy.
74 
Sub-national governance is very important 
for it deals with the local population from much closer than the central government. A UNDP 
report on capacity development remarks that a local development agenda is a tangible 
foundation for reconstruction and participatory decision-making for the population at large.
75
 
This makes a lot of sense in the context where the international community is slowly losing its 
 
interest in Afghanistan, because of other larger economic problems and lack of public support 
in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, et cetera. So, it is important to 
develop the capacity of the Afghan population and the country‘s sub-national administration. 
This approach has been expected to bring strong positive catalytic effects on participatory 
resource allocation and economic revival at sub-national levels.
76 
The establishment of 
Community Development Councils (CDC) in huge numbers in Afghanistan has been a 
positive step towards decentralization. The idea has been accentuated through Afghanistan 
Compact where the Afghan government has pledged to give priority to establishment of 
functional institutions at the provincial level.
77 
The sub-national consultation process of the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) also facilitated a dialogue between the 
central government and the provinces, leading to the formation of many village-based and 
district-based development plans.
78
 
However, the transition period is a time when many complex social, political and 
 
economic issues come together, thus making sub-national state-building difficult. Hamish 
 
Nixon, an expert on sub-national state-building in Afghanistan, asserts that the two things 
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currently complicating the expansion of sub-national state-building in Afghanistan are:  i. 
limited state capacity and low degree of penetration to local levels; and ii. a considerable 
desire on the part of both the government and citizenry for strong centralization due to the 
fear of fragmentation of the country.
79 
Lyall brings up the same issue saying the participants 
of the First Bonn Conference ―overestimated the danger of ethnic civil war and so created a 
hyper-centralized executive office, which actually made ethnic conflict more, rather than less, 
likely.‖80 However, without decentralizing the government to some extent, it is impossible to 
ensure a smooth flow of services to the community. 
Nixon further reports that sub-national state-building in Afghanistan has been 
characterized by a lack of sub-national governance policy.
81 
It is important for the 
government not just to establish sub-national committees but also to define their functions, 
allocate resources to them, and establish provisions to ensure accountability. One major 
hindrance is, undoubtedly, the government‘s inability to ensure security. The effect of 
continuous violence in Afghan societies has been to displace a large number of people to 
nearby Pakistan and other countries—a clear indicator of declining manpower or human 
capacity in Afghan societies. Illiteracy, poverty and the social structure that encourage only 
males to work add more impediments to the pre-existing low capacity of the society.  This 
lack of state-capacity to ensure security—or to fight insurgency—and its effect on sub- 
national capacity development displays the interdependence nature of all the various actors 
and variables. 
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IV. Impact of the Transition Period on Afghanistan’s Economic 
Development Prospects 
 
 
Economic development doesn‘t exist independent of political and social development. 
The variables that we discussed and analyzed above show direct political impact, but what 
makes them dangerous in the Afghan context is their impact on the economy. Economic 
development is measured by sophisticated means, such as GDP, imports and exports, overall 
budget, exchange rates, et cetera, which are not very familiar to the local public. This 
unfamiliarity makes economics a less discussed issue in the public domain; however, its 
impact is ubiquitous, ranging from the fulfillment of the basic needs of the community to the 
financing of the large development projects. Amidst crises of legitimacy, corruption, lack of 
national and sub-national capacity, and insecurity during the transition period, Afghanistan 
has suffered economically too. 
Although slight progresses have been made throughout the transition period in 
rebuilding the country‘s economy, the changes are not groundbreaking. The progress is 
neither uniform nor commensurate with the total effort applied so far. According to the IMF, 
the most pressing economic tasks of transition-period Afghanistan involved restoring 
economic stability and rebuilding institutions in an unstable security situation.
82 
The major 
concern of security has had a direct impact on private investment. Another major problem for 
Afghanistan‘s economic growth has been corruption.  However, with foreign troops returning 
back home and the Afghan government getting more control over its political and economic 
policy-making, the main hindrance for Afghanistan‘s economic growth not only remains 
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corruption, but also the inability of the government to institute effective policies to secure and 
maximize foreign aid, including a failure to create long-term community-driven projects. 
Security is a big issue impacting economic development in Afghanistan. The presence 
of the highly effective ISAF forces have greatly aided the business environment. However, 
their continuous withdrawal means that challenges are growing and that economic 
development is at peril again. A World Bank report suggested that ―Afghanistan will need an 
open-ended commitment from foreign donors of at least $7 billion a year, much of which will 
probably have to be spent on security unless the insurgency has weakened by 2014.‖83 The 
withdrawal of international military forces also means the possibility of withdrawal of many 
international organizations that are currently operating in Afghanistan, for security reasons. 
International organizations‘ presence would not only complement the government‘s request 
for foreign aid but would also provide an assessment of progress in various fields through 
research and analysis. However, with the possibility of their recall, this seems impossible. 
After the formation of Karzai-led democratic government, opium cultivation has 
surged in the country and has become an important economic activity. The Taliban regime 
before 2001 had banned opium production and destroyed the crop around the country on the 
belief that Islam does not allow cultivation and use of drugs. However, during the transition 
period, the Taliban insurgents themselves got involved in opium production, justifying their 
action as an effort to assist the fight against the Western coalition. As a result, Afghanistan is 
now the world‘s largest producer and exporter of opium. According to an IMF report, 
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Afghanistan supplies 85% of the world‘s heroin and morphine.84 It is clear that opium 
production is an important economic activity of the transition period and at the same time is 
part of the illegitimate economy of the country that involves local farmers, Taliban insurgents 
and many governmental officials. However, opium farming has helped to improve the living 
conditions of many farmers in the country as they sell for a very high price. A UNODC report 
indicates that the per-hectare income of opium cultivation is US$ 10,700.
85 
Revenues from 
this cultivation provide the basic necessities of food, shelter and an increasing income-level. 
However, the downside of opium farming is that it also has financed terrorist activities, 
smuggling and corruption. It has helped strengthen terrorist insurgents and at the same time 
facilitated corruption at the administrative level. It is interesting to observe that opium 
cultivation is highest in the regions that are categorized as high or extremely risky by the 
United Nations Department of Safety and Security.
86 
By the report of UNODC, 78 per cent of 
opium cultivation is done in those risky zones.
87 
We see that the lack of state capacity to 
 
encourage legitimate economic activities, cut down on corruption and increase counter- 
insurgency efforts has stimulated opium production, which has ultimately led to the economic 
instability of the country. 
The primary goal of Afghanistan is to be economically self-sustaining. This is an unlikely 
possibility in the light of all the foreign aid that flows into the country. However the aim is not 
to cut off all the foreign aid, but to create effective means to put it into sustainable use. Thus, 
one of the commitments of the Bonn Conference II has been to increase aid effectiveness to 
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attain a sustainable market economy in line with the social needs of the population.
88 
Aid 
effectiveness relies heavily on the growth of private investment and financial institutions in 
the country, which as mentioned above is at jeopardy due to security issues. Aid that comes as 
grants harms the country‘s economic potential the most by limiting the government‘s ability 
to collect revenue through taxation and through involvement in international trade. An IMF 
report indicates that the overall current account deficit was financed almost entirely through 
grants, raising concerns of medium-term sustainability.
89
 
The impact of the transition period on economic development can be rephrased to 
explain the impact of the variables described earlier (lack of legitimacy, corruption, lack of 
capacity) on economic development (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Legitimacy of 
the 
Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
Development 
 
 
 
 
Capacity 
Development 
Reduced 
Level of 
Corruption 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Elements absolutely necessary for economic development 
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Through our study and analysis of these variables we can summarize their impacts on 
economic development as follows: 
 
A. Legitimacy and Economic Development: 
  A government alleged as illegitimate is also perceived as an untrustworthy receiver of 
foreign aid—the largest source of Afghanistan‘s revenue. 
  Most of the foreign aid that comes to the country is not channeled through the 
government. This ―external budgeting‖ 90 makes it difficult for the government to 
execute economic development policies and decreases its aid utilization capacity in the 
long-run. 
  Lack of legitimacy, derived by the government‘s highly centralized presence, means 
 
that economic development is capital-centered. 
 
  A legitimate government can be effective in generating revenue through taxation as 
people and businesses find it logical to pay taxes only if they trust that their payment 
will come back to them in the form of developed infrastructure. 
  Nixon mentions that high aid dependency is supposed to compromise state 
 
sovereignty, thus reducing the government‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 Michael Holden, ―Afghanistan: Economic activity and policy challenges,‖ Parliamentary Information and 
Research Service PRB 07-29E (November 2007): 5. 
91 Hamish Nixon, ―Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in 
Afghanistan,‖ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Briefing Paper Series, April 2007, 5. 
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B. Corruption and Economic Development: 
  Corruption drains aid into the pockets of individuals thus making it impossible to 
invest in any areas—whether it be security, or economic reform. 
  Corruption aids the drug-based economy, which being an underground industry clouds 
the figures on legal economic activity
92 
and also hampers the production of other 
sustainable and export-oriented agricultural products. 
  Aid in Afghanistan has mostly been supply driven.93 This can be seen as an indirect 
cause to corruption since supply-driven aid relieves the receiver from the necessity to 
expend effort
94 
or be accountable. 
 
 
 
 
C. Lack of Capacity and Economic Development: 
  Lack of agricultural capacity—irrigation, machineries, fertilizers, property rights, land 
reform—means low agricultural output. 
  Higher import over export has caused a consistent trade deficit in Afghanistan.95 
 
However in the past years this deficit had been covered by foreign aid. But the 
increasing lack of capacity to utilize foreign aid means that if export-oriented policies 
and reforms are not planned and executed then the deficit might enlarge in near future. 
 Lack of institutional capacity is inversely proportional to a country‘s claim for debt- 
 
relief. This is because lack of capacity leads to low levels of output, below the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 Holden, ―Afghanistan,‖ 2. 
93 Nixon, ―Aiding,‖ 5. 
94 Ibid., 5. 
95 Holden, ―Afghanistan,‖ 3. 
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demands of the donors.  However, in the past years, Afghanistan has been able to 
achieve debt-relief.
96
 
 Lack of capacity to counter insurgencies means low level of security, which directly 
 
affects the level of private investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 Ibid., 5. 
  
 
V. Tying Everything Together 
 
A. Division of function 
 
The stabilization of a state with a long history of conflict is possible only if all the 
local, sub-national, national and international actors work cooperatively in all the areas— 
social, political and economic. The problems arising from the complexities of the Afghan 
transition period cannot be totally eliminated, but can be minimized if a simple formula of 
division of labor or role identification is applied. Afghanistan requires a balanced approach by 
these actors, and the role of the government is very significant in creating this balance.
97 
The 
 
diagram below (Figure 2) provides a simple model of this division of labor idea. 
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Figure 2. The balanced interplay of various actors 
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In an ideal situation, the government, by virtue of its legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency, receives aid from the international community. The aid is utilized by the 
government to strengthen national security forces and to fund sub-national administration, 
assigning them the responsibility to provide services to the local community. Security is 
provided by the central government itself, so that uniformity is maintained in the national 
security forces‘ activities and so that the government has leverage over other armed groups in 
the country. The sub-national administration, on the other hand, utilizes the funds distributed 
by the government to provide basic services like education, health, awareness, security from 
small social problems, agricultural infrastructures, incentives to initiate community-led 
development, encouragement in establishing new businesses and continuing old, et cetera. 
The sub-national level will face the necessity to accurately report its work to the 
government—thus checking their corruption too—which then makes reports to the donors. 
The sub-national level is also provided with capacity development training directly from the 
international community and NGOs, who have experience in such areas partly because of 
their involvement in other countries and partly because of their understanding of the Afghan 
community in the last decade. This approach attempts to create a balance between the 
functions of the actors who aim to serve the local community. However, one cannot disregard 
the fact that there are various scenarios where functions overlap, for example when the 
international community deals directly with the local community or when the sub-national 
and national authorities have a tussle over their jurisdiction. The idea is not to totally avoid 
these overlapping areas. The government has to do thorough research on the complexities and 
devise a workable formula assigning specific functions to different levels, so that the work is 
made easy. 
  
B. Strengthening political legitimacy 
 
The government is able to divide these functions (mentioned above) properly only by 
strengthening its legitimacy. The development of Afghanistan lies in the hands of Afghan 
people and initiatives have to come from within. A legitimate government is one that is ready 
to take the lead of the state and lead it towards self-sustainability. A legitimate government 
can also lead the approach for ―participatory development‖ by strengthening the capacity of 
its administration and framing this approach in the national plan for development.
98 
The 
overall progress of the state revolves around legitimacy and conversely, legitimacy is 
strengthened by the progress in these various areas. 
 
 
 
Effective 
counter 
insurgency 
efforts 
 
 
 
Utilization of 
foreign aid 
Reduced level 
of corruption 
 
 
Legitimacy 
of the 
government 
 
 
Capacity 
Development 
Economic 
Development 
 
 
 
Accountability 
at national and 
subnational 
level 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Legitimacy, an important variable that connects all other variables together 
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As mentioned earlier, because of the significance of various actors, the government 
needs to strengthen its legitimacy at all levels—international, sub-national and local. By 
utilizing foreign aid with accountability, by aiding the international effort of creating a 
terrorist-free world, and by strengthening the values of human rights and democratic 
governance, the government can strengthen its international legitimacy. By distributing funds 
at the sub-national level to facilitate service delivery, by avoiding nepotism by allowing 
heterogeneity in the administration and by checking on corruption within its administration, 
the government can strengthen its sub-national legitimacy. By providing people with basic 
needs, by securing the people from terrorist‘s atrocities and negligence of their own 
administration, and by successfully completing the various reconstruction and development 
projects that raise the living standard of the people, the government can strengthen its local 
legitimacy. 
The complexity of Afghan situation is that political and economic challenges are 
interrelated and change in one area is possible only through a parallel change in the other. 
Legitimacy of the government depends on its ability to develop state capacity and formulate 
sustainable economic policies. Conversely, development of state capacity and economic 
progress is possible only if the government is seen as legitimate by its people and by the 
international community. 
 
C. Transition to Transformation 
 
After a decade of foreign military assistance and huge publicity in the international 
arena, Afghanistan has increased its involvement in international diplomacy. Its participation 
in international affairs is growing. By leading the Bonn Conference II in Germany, 
Afghanistan not only showed its eagerness to correct the misconception about the country‘s 
  
overall status but also gave a glimpse of its developing capacity.
99 
Afghanistan also claimed 
that the transition period is approaching its end and named the period of 2015-2024 as 
Transformation Decade.
100 
It has shown a few positive changes in the overall economic 
situation of the country since the end of the Taliban regime. The per capita GDP of the 
country has risen from about US$150- US$180 in 2002
101 
to around US$530 in 2010/2011.
102
 
 
The IMF considers this improvement a signal that the economy has been robust with real 
 
GDP growth averaging more than 10 percent annually over the past five years (8 percent in 
 
2010/11), and inflation moderating.103 One of the major achievements has been the 
implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). 104 Progress has 
also been made in the area of government‘s revenue collection, showing an increase of 
collection to 11 percent of GDP in 2010/11 from less than 7 percent in 2005/06.
105
 
Afghanistan‘s recent entry into SAARC, a regional group of South Asian countries, 
 
has opened doors for the development of the trade sector, raising its prospects for benefit 
through the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Afghanistan joined SAARC on April 3, 
2007.
106 
As a result of this inclusion, Afghanistan is now able to enjoy concessions and 
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reductions of tariffs when trading with other contracting states. 
107 
Afghanistan‘s membership 
in SAARC means that it will be able to work closely with one of the rising economic powers 
of the world, India. Pakistan‘s presence in SAARC will, on the other hand, help address 
security concerns in a cooperative regional level. Afghanistan‘s energy resources also provide 
great trade prospects as well as its capacity to serve as an important link between South Asia 
and Central Asia.
108 
New trade prospects will also encourage the Afghan population to shift 
from drug-based agriculture to the production of legitimate crops and products. 
To move from transition to transformation Afghanistan definitely has to pay special 
attention to all the variables we have discussed earlier. However, it should also focus in 
making itself self-sustainable and look for new opportunities beyond the aid from the Western 
world. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examined the literature to establish the interconnectedness among 
various variables that play important roles in the political and economic transition of a state. 
In the case of Afghanistan, their role and interplay was profound, clearly shaping the 
country‘s present and probably its future. The variables included:  legitimacy, corruption and 
state capacity. We found out that since Operation Enduring Freedom or perhaps a little before 
 
that, Afghanistan‘s government has lost its legitimacy within the country and outside, and 
thus it has become politically and economically vulnerable. Corruption levels in the country 
have remained high, and are even increasing despite the existing anti-corruption policies. 
While discussing state capacity, we found it important to analyze the differences between a 
centralized state and a decentralized state, and there implications in the case of Afghanistan. 
Although a centralized form would strengthen legitimacy in some ways in the international 
community, a decentralized form was found to be very important to gain public legitimacy 
and pave the path for long-term sustainable development. This finding, combined with the 
current centralized government‘s lack of reach and capacity, led us to the understanding that 
sub-national state capacity should be strengthened in Afghanistan and that stabilization would 
be possible only if there is a balance between the national and the sub-national level. The 
overlapping areas between legitimacy, corruption and capacity were profound in their impact 
on the economic development prospect of the country and the role of legitimacy was 
especially important in the case of Afghanistan, since it lies in the hands of the government to 
lead the country after the withdrawal of foreign troops and the reduction in international aid. 
  
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
―Afghanistan‘s ―cancer of corruption‖.‖ Canadian Medical Association Journal 182(4) 
(2010): http://www.cmaj.ca. 
 
Amin, Matiullah. ―Leaving Afghan Development in the Wrong Hands.‖ Foreign Affairs: 
Council on Foreign Relations. February 13, 2012. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137183/matiullah-amin/leaving-afghan- 
development-in-the-wrong-hands. 
 
Barfield, Thomas J. ―Problems in Starting Legitimacy in Afghanistan.‖ Iranian Studies 3, no. 
2 (2004): 263-293. doi: 10.1080/0021086042000268100. 
 
BBC News. ―Afghanistan Profile.‖ South Asia. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia- 
12024253. 
 
BBC News. ―Karzai blames allies for problems.‖ 20 January 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7839953.stm. 
 
Beblawi, Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo.―The Rentier State.‖ British Society for Middle 
Eastern Studies 16, no. 2 (1989): pp. 195-196. http://www.jstor.org/stable/195155 . 
 
Bhatia, Michael. ―The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in 
Post-Bonn Afghanistan.‖ International Peacekeeping 14,  no. 1 (2007): 90-107. doi: 
10.1080/13533310601114301. 
 
Bush, George W.  ―Address to the Nation.‖ White House Press Release. Washington D.C. 
September 20, 2001. 
 
Bush, George W.  ―State of the Union Address to the Nation.‖ White House Press Release. 
Washington D.C. January 29, 2002. 
 
Council on Foreign Relations. ―Conference Conclusions: International Conference on 
Afghanistan, December 2011.‖ December 5, 2011. 
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/conference-conclusions-international-conference- 
afghanistan-december-2011/p26689. 
 
Dibb, Paul. ―The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: lessons to be learned?.‖ Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 5 ( 2010): 495-509. doi: 
10.1080/10357718.2010.513366. 
 
Etzioni, Amitai. ―Corruption Reduction.‖ Harvard International Review: Perspectives 
(Winter 2011): 22-25. 
  
Fields, Mark and Ahmed, Ramsha. ―A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application 
to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan.‖ Institute for National Strategic Studies: Strategic 
Perspectives 8. (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2011). 
 
Geller, A., Mussavi Rizi, S.M., Latek, M.M. and Thies, C. ―State Capacity and Conflict: 
Evidence from Afghanistan.‖ Computational Social Science Society of America 
Annual Conference. Oct 9-12, 2011. Santa Fe, New Mexico. 
 
Goodhand, Jonathan. ―Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post- 
conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.‖ International Peacekeeping 15,  no. 3 (2008): 
40-423. doi: 10.1080/13533310802058984. 
 
Holden, Michael. ―Afghanistan: Economic activity and policy challenges.‖ Parliamentary 
Information and Research Service PRB 07-29E (November 2007): 1-6. 
 
International Crisis Group. ―Afghanistan Conflict History.‖ January 2010. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/research- 
resources/conflict-histories/afghanistan.aspx. 
 
International Monetary Fund. ―Islamic Republic of Afghanistan- Program Note.‖ April 9 
2012.  http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/notes/afghanistan.htm. 
 
International Monetary Fund. ―Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy: First Annual Report (2008/2009).‖ (Washington, D.C.: IMF 
Publication Services, November 2009). 
 
International Monetary Fund. ―Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Detailed Assessment Report 
on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism.‖ 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF Publication Services, November 2011). 
 
International Monetary Fund. ―Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Report on Recent Economic 
Development and Prospects, and the Role of the Fund in the Reconstruction Process.‖ 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF Publication Services, October 2002). 
 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. ―Afghanistan National Development Strategy1387-1391 
(2008-2013): A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty 
Reduction.‖ 
 
Kurer, Oscar. ―Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and Measurement.‖ 
Political Studies 53, no. 1 (2005): 222-239. Academic Search Complete, EBSCO 
host. 
 
Kuru, Ahmet. "The Rentier State Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen 
Case." Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International Relations 1, no. 1(2002): 51-71. 
  
Lansford, Tom. 9/11 and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Press, 
2012. 
 
Lyall, Jason. ―Afghanistan‘s Lost Decade.‖ Foreign Affairs: Council on Foreign Relations. 
December 15, 2011. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136787/jason- 
lyall/afghanistans-lost-decade. 
 
Maley, William. ―Afghanistan: an historical and geographical appraisal.‖ International 
Review of the Red Cross 9, no. 880 (2010): 859-876. doi: 
10.1017/S1816383111000154 859. 
 
Marsden, Peter. ―Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process.‖ International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944- ) 79, no. 1 (January 2003): 91-105. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095543. 
 
McMahon, Robert. ―Legitimacy Questions in Afghanistan.‖ Council on Foreign Relations. 
November 2, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/legitimacy-questions- 
afghanistan/p20584. 
 
Mohanty, Satyajit. ―Afghanistan in SAFTA: Issues and Implications.‖ Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies. Article No. 2101. 28 August 2006. 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/afghanistan/afghanistan-in-safta-issues-and-implications- 
2101.html. 
NewStatesman . Leader . ―Killed in the Name of Crooked Karzai.‖ November 9, 2009, 7. 
Nixon, Hamish. ―Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in 
Afghanistan.‖ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Briefing Paper Series. 
April 2007. 
 
Nixon, Hamish. ―Subnational State-Building in Afghanistan.‖ Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit: Synthesis Paper Series. April 2008. 
 
Parenti, Christian. ―Who Rules Afghanistan.‖ The Nation.  November 15, 2004. 13-18. 
 
Riphenburg, Carol J. ―Afghanistan: Out of global mainstream?.‖ Third World Quarterly 27, 
no. 3 (2006): 507-524. doi: 10.1080/01436590600587820. 
 
Robichaud, Carl. ―Buying Time in Afghanistan.‖ World Policy Journal  (Summer 2007): 1-8. 
doi: 10.1162/wopj.2007.24.2.1. 
 
Sidwell, Michael. ―Corruption Undermines Afghanistan‘s Future.‖ Transparency Watch. 
January 2009. 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2009/january_2009/in_the_news 
/corruption_in_afghanistan. 
  
Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. ―Leaving Security in Safe Hands: Identity, Legitimacy and Cohesion 
in the New Afghan and Iraqi Armies.‖ Third World Quarterly 30, no. 8 (2009): 1483- 
1501. doi: 10.1080/01436590903321851. 
 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. ―Protocol of Accession of Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan To Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).‖ 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=36. 
 
The Economist. ―Afghanistan: What comes next.‖ December 3, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21540999. 
 
The London Conference on Afghanistan.  ―The Afghanistan Compact.‖ 31 January-1 
February 2006. 
 
Transparency International. ―Corruption Perception Index 2011.‖ 
http://www.transparency.org. 
 
Transparency International. News Room. ―Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption.‖ 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq. 
 
United Nations Development Programme. Capacity Development Group. edited by 
Wignaraja, Kann ―Capacity Development During Periods of Transition.‖ 2007. 
 
United Nations Development Programme. Democratic Governance Group: Bureau of 
Development Policy. ―Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations.‖ 
June 2010. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Ministry of Counter Narcotics. ―Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary 
Findings.‖ October 2011. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). ―UNODC Reports Diverging Trends 
Between Opium Free North and Lawless South of Afghanistan.‖ August 27, 2007. 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2007-08-27.html. 
 
United Nations System. ―Common Country Assessment for the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan.‖ October 2004. 
 
Wilder, Andrew. ―Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police.‖ 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Issues Paper Series. July 2007. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVAL SHEET 
 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that  Raju Adhikari   has successfully completed 
 
   hii_ Senior Honors Thesis, entitled: 
 
 
 
Complex  fnterplay of Variables in Transition Period Afghanistan and 
Need for aBalanced Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2, 2012   
Date 
